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1Abstract
A moment of consequence to the postbellum U.S. tari¤ debate was the “conversion”
of David Ames Wells, Commissioner of the Revenue from 1865-1870, to free trade.
When he began his work Wells was a disciple of the eminent American protectionist
Henry C. Carey. By the age of forty, however, he had become America’s answer
to Britain’s Sir Robert Peel: a public …gure of tremendous in‡uence, who, having
changed his mind on the issue, became the standard-bearer for free trade in both the
intellectual and political arenas. Half a century and more in the past, when Wells’s
name was better rememberedin Americaneconomic andpolitical history, several sto-
ries were toldof the causes of his conversion: some attributed it ultimately tothe force
of ideas, some to interests. My purpose is to demonstrate that the unacknowledged
but most important cause was Wells’s relationship with Edward Atkinson, and Wells
and Atkinson’s mutual wish to grant e¤ective protection, or net protection, to cotton
manufacturers. The story of Wells’s conversion that unfolds in the demonstration
is not one that disentangles and assigns weights to the contributions of theory and
interests. It shows instead how each determined the other.
Key Words and Phrases: Wells, David Ames; Atkinson, Edward; free trade; revenue com-
mission; e¤ective protection; net protection. JEL Classi…cation: B1, B31, F13, N71
21 INTRODUCTION
Amoment ofconsequence to the postbellum U.S. tari¤ controversy was theconversion
of David Ames Wells, Commissioner of the Revenue from 1865-1870, to free trade.
When he began his work Wells was a disciple of the eminent American protectionist
Henry C. Carey. Within …ve years, by the time of his commission’s termination, Wells
strove and was encouraged by notable others to be an American Richard Cobden:
the standard-bearer for free trade in both the intellectual and political arenas of the
United States, as Cobden had been in Britain.2
Wells’s is not the only conversion story coloring nineteenth-century tari¤ history.
Nor is it the most colorful one, much less the most celebrated. Before he inspired
Wells’s original embrace of protection, Henry Carey was a free trader. But in 1847,
distressed by the Walker tari¤ reduction passed in Congress the previous year, Carey
“jumped out of bed, and dressing [him]self, was aprotectionist from that hour”(Dorf-
man 1946, p. 799). Better known and still provocative of debate is the conversion of
Sir Robert Peel, at nearly the same time, to free trade. As Britain’s Prime Minister
at the apogee of agitation for repeal of the Corn Laws, Peel faced the task of balanc-
ing the claims of agriculturalists against those of manufacturers, the hungry, and the
Anti-Corn Law League under the leadership of Cobden. From his elevation to Prime
2Edward Atkinson to Wells, undated 1867, Atkinson Papers, carton 16; Elihu Burritt to Wells,
May 14, 1869, Wells Papers, reel 1, cited by Howe (2000, p. 146); see also Atkinson to Wells,
November 8, 1884, cited by Sproat (1968, p. 179), and Joyner (1939, p. 203).
3Minister in 1841 through 1844, Peel declared his support for the agricultural body
and, on one occasion, led his fellow Conservatives to vote 308-1 against consideration
of repeal (Irwin 1989, pp. 43-50). In 1845, when Cobden made his most forceful
argument in Parliament against the Corn Laws and the moment arrived for Peel to
reply, he crumpledhis notes instead and said to the ally at his side, “You must answer
this, for I cannot” (Morley 1881, p. 213). In 1846 Peel called for repeal and achieved
it (McLean 2001, pp. 115-117).
To what force can such a momentous turn be attributed? A large literature traces
theintellectual andpolitical trajectory ofthe Conservativesunder Peel in searchofthe
causes of the policy change.3 William Grampp (1960) points to the role of politicians,
most notably Peel, who promoted the common good as perceived through ideas like
Cobden’s. George Stigler (1976, p. 352) suggests that such explanations ‡atter the
politicos (and even more the economists) while disregarding the interests they serve:
“if Cobden had spoken only Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Peel had been a
narrow, stupid man, England would have moved toward free trade in grain as its
agricultural classes declined and its manufacturing and commercial classes grew.”4
Somewhere between the poles of primacy of ideas or interests, Douglas Irwin (1989,
p. 55) corroborates Peel’s importance and …nds that “economic ideas, and not the
3Irwin (1989) reviews the literature through the 1980s, emphasizing work at the disciplinary
intersection of history and economics. Political scientists have devoted more attention to the episode
from the 1990s to the present: Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) o¤ers an updated survey.
4Quoted by Irwin (1989, p. 41).
4pressure of interests, were central to Peel’s conversion.” After parsing the Prime
Minister’s own words, however, he quali…es the …nding substantially: Peel drifted
towards repeal by “experimentation and evidence” of the causes of food’s scarcity
and the relationship of agricultural prices to wages, not by “abstract reasoning.”
Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) redirects attention from Peel to all of the House of
Commons: she analyzes parliamentary roll call data using a logistic regression model
in which parliamentarians’ votes on repeal are related to constituent interests, party,
and a measure of ideology.5 Repeal succeeded in 1846, she argues, precisely because
ideology ceased to matter: the Peelite Conservatives, who in prior votes had de…ed
their constituents’ interests for party and ideology, at last began to represent them.
Iain McLean (2001), using similar econometrics in combination with a rich survey
of the historical moment’s politics, stakes out the precise middle ground. Those
who would attribute the policy change to ideas, he concludes, do not show “how
ideology is translated into action.” Those who attribute the change to interests fail
to explain “why some prominent people” – most notably Peel, whose government fell
in consequence of his achievement – “acted against their obvious material interests”
(McLean 2001, p. 133).
The foregoing debate partakes of a larger and abidingone. At stake is more thana
determinationof the motives of Peel and his contemporaries inthe matter of the Corn
5The measure of ideology is derived for each member from the extent that his “coordinate” in a
one-dimensional political space is unexplained by either constituent interests or party.
5Laws in mid-nineteenth century Britain. Can one presume that great policy changes
are e¤ected, either directly or indirectly, by ideas – a position that some authors (e.g.
Goldstein and Keohane, 1993)have identi…ed as the “re‡ectivist”approach? Or is the
more tenable presumption, or at least the more fruitful, that policy changes are driven
by agents’ rational responses to given interests and constraints – the “rationalist”
approach? Supposing that one accepts some synthesis of both approaches (as one
seems commonly to do when given exactly two of them), then what can be said
about how ideas and interests interrelate?
A history of the Corn Laws controversy that maintains the importance to repeal
of ideas as well as interests, and illustrates also their interrelation, is apt to treat
Peel as a central …gure and his conversion to free trade as a decisive episode. The
history of America’s postbellum tari¤ controversy will bene…t from similar treatment
of David Wells.
Two likely objections come to mind. The …rst is that the American case is di¤er-
ent from the British: the American agitation for tari¤ reform was not, on the whole,
successful. But the postbellum tari¤ controversy’s imprint on nineteenth-century
American thought and politics makes the reformers’ cause worth studying in its own
right. In addition, Anthony Howe (2000, pp. 152, 156-157) has discussed how the
reformers’ e¤orts, building upon those of Cobden and Peel’s generation, established
an ideological tradition that ultimately (if posthumously) bore fruit. The 1913 Un-
6derwood tari¤ reduction, and later and more enduringly the 1941 Atlantic Charter,
pre…gured a world commercial order manifesting their vision.
A second objection is that Wells was no Sir Robert Peel. He never held elected
o¢ce – and not for lack of trying. On the occasions that he ran for U.S. Congress, he
lost. One of Wells’s disadvantages was his running as a Democrat in a Connecticut
district dominatedby Republicans. Others werehis highvoice, nervous temperament,
and sensitivity to hecklers (Joyner 1939, pp. 174, 203-174). Even if Wells had been
appointed Secretary of the Treasury – as he twice anticipated (Joyner 1939, p. 89;
Terrill 1969, p. 549) and was twice disappointed – he still would have exercised less
political power than Peel. That the powers granted to him as Special Commissioner
of the Revenue were considerably less goes without saying.
Nor, to push the last objection farther, was Wells even a Henry Carey. Joseph
Schumpeter (1950, p. 524) wrote of Wells that “our analytic apparatus owes nothing
to him.” If the same were said of Carey, the reason would be that his apparatus
was either too early, or too quaintly folded into a sweeping historicist narrative, to
be familiar to the late-twentieth century regional scientists who reinvented parts of
it.6 Carey was a grand theorist and an original thinker. Although Wells displayed
‡ashes of originality (Perelman 1995), most of the few authors who have devoted
pages rather than sentences to him emphasize the past salience and in‡uence of his
6Meardon (2005) o¤ers a sketch of Carey’s thought that underlines his historicism.
7ideas, not their inventiveness (Stanwood 1903; Tarbell 1911; Dorfman 1949; Sproat
1968; Terrill 1969; Cohen 2002). This is true even of his biographers (Joyner 1939;
Ferleger 1942).
The onetime salience and sway of Wells’s ideas, however, establishes his historical
importance, and so too the importance of his conversion. Cohen (2002, p. 88) de-
scribes Wells as “the leading economic writer” among late-nineteenth century liberal
reformers. Dorfman (1946, pp. 969-970; 1949, pp. 134-135) corroborates the enor-
mous currency of some of his published writings. Sproat (1968, p. 179), amplifying
Stanwood’s (1903, p. 158) judgment, writes that Wells “exerted more ‘potent in‡u-
ence’ on American tari¤ thought in the late nineteenth century than any politician
or academic economist of his time.” Tarbell (1911, p. 29), an early twentieth century
free-trade partisan, upholds him as one “to whom we owe more credit than he has
ever received” for his “big in‡uence onthe country” during his tenure as Special Com-
missioner. And in the decades after the termination of his o¢ce, Terrill (1969, pp.
548, 552-544, 549-550, 550) documents his prominence among the Mugwumps; his
leverage inside the …rst Cleveland administration through Secretary of State Thomas
Bayard and Treasury Secretary Daniel Manning; his close alliances with congressional
leaders including William R. Morrison of Illinois, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee from 1875 to 1887, whom he fed ideas and helped to devise plans
for tari¤ reform; and his potency even as late as 1890, when he may have written, and
8certainly shaped, the minority report in opposition the McKinley tari¤ bill. Wells
was the man most crucial all at once to the rhetoric, popular understanding, and
political strategy of the free trade position in the United States from the late 1860s
to the 1890s. The question asked of Peel applies with equal relevance to Wells. How
did he come to that position?
Wells’s conversion a¤ords an opportunity to revisit the subject of ideas, interests,
and their interrelation with a new case study, and to emerge with new insight. The
insight concerns the interrelation. Wells exempli…es howa practitioner’s allegiance to
certain interests stimulates his acceptance of economic ideas, and how a proselytizer
adapts the ideas for interested ends. The practitioner and the proselytizer are, in this
case, the same man, and the relation of ideas and interests is circular.
The circle is closed with a twist in Wells’s story. His conversion was secured by
an agent whose importance prior authors (e.g. Dorfman 1949, p. 9; Ferleger 1942,
p. 195 and passim) have noted but not probed. The agent is Edward Atkinson, a
Massachusettscottontextile manufacturer, pamphleteer, andreformadvocate. Under
Atkinson’s in‡uence, Wells perceived his own interests and the nation’s to be aligned
with those of the cotton manufacturing industry. In numerous reports, articles, and
books in which Atkinson and Wells articulated the case for free trade, they altered
peoples’ perceptions of their interests – including each other’s perception of his own
interests. What follows, then, is the story of David Wells’s adoption and elaboration
9of an economic theory supportive of tari¤ reform. But it is also the story of how
the theoretical case for free trade in the United States transformed the interests and
allegiances of its masters.
2 HENRY CAREY’S DISCIPLE
DavidWells’s path toprominenceinnineteenth century political economy wouldhave
been di¢cult to foretell given the …rst thirty years of his life. After graduating from
Williams College, in Western Massachusetts, in 1847 and returning to his hometown
of Spring…eld to work as an assistant editor of the daily Republican, Wells was un-
doubtedly well acquainted with political economy by 1848. The Rev. Joseph Alden
taught the course at Williams (Perry 1899, p. 692), and Wells was exposed to its
application at the Republican under the guidance of its editor, Samuel Bowles. But
there is no evidence that the subject interested him much. At Williams, Wells’s fa-
vorite instructors were the college’s president, Mark Hopkins, who lectured in the
students’ senior year on the topics in moral philosophy that political economy had
not covered the year before, and the tutor in chemistry (Joyner 1939, p. 13). At the
Republican he distinguished himself less in the art of editorial writing than in the me-
chanics of newspaper production: Wells invented a device for folding newspapers that
was attached to the press, improving the …rm’s e¢ciency. When he quit the paper in
1848, he sold his rights to the invention and enrolled in the newly-founded Lawrence
10Scienti…c School of Harvard College. The school was endowed by Boston cotton tex-
tile magnate Abbot Lawrence for the purpose of providing scienti…c knowledge for
practical ends.
Wells earnedhis bachelor of science degree summa cum laude in 1851 and began a
career as a lecturer in physics andchemistry at the Groton Academy and an assistant
professor at the Lawrence School. He fused his scienti…c interests with his publishing
acuity in the Annual of Scienti…c Discovery, a yearly volume detailing the progress
of the sciences and new inventions for a general audience. As the Annual attracted
attention and became more lucrative, he dropped his teaching to devote himself to it
and other publishing enterprises exclusively. In 1855, with the expectation of buying
a partnership in the publishing house of G. P. Putnam Sons, he moved …rst to New
York and then to Philadelphia to edit Putnam’s Pennsylvania Farm Journal.
He discovered at last that the publishing side of the business was less suited to
his taste and talents than investigation and writing (Ferleger 1942, p. 2; Joyner
1939, p. 23). But his years with Putnam, particularly in Philadelphia, were not
wasted. There he met the prominent economist and committed protectionist Henry
C. Carey and was admitted as a junior member to his intellectual entourage. Wells’s
career as a political economist was not born at that moment, but it was gestated
in his association with Carey. He had met a man of ideas and in‡uence. Carey’s
ideas would soon be much in demand in Washington, and his in‡uence would carry
11Wells’s talents farther than would the endeavors in scienti…c editing, publishing, and
(of course) the academy.
By 1858 Wells was living in Troy and still at work with scienti…c writing. He
was eager to make himself known and spread word of his two recent textbooks, The
Science of Common Things (1857) and Principles and Applications of Chemistry
(1858); his illustrious acquaintance from Philadelphia was a possible means. The
texts related tangentially to Carey’s interests – at least in parts – so Wells composed
a letter. The texts might not have much to teach you, Wells wrote to Carey on May
1,
But in writing them I have kept steadily in view the principles of political
economy as I have learned them from you and have endeavored to shape
my teachings into consonance with them. This has been done indirectly
and by examples, apropo with the subjects treated of, rather by any direct
precepts. If you will allow me, I will forward them ... I shall be most
happy to receive your last books, & have been meaning to order them. I
have also read your letters in the Tribune with a great deal of pleasure.
(Wells-Carey letters, May 1, 1858)
The impression one gets from Wells’s correspondence with Carey during this time
is of a young man eager to make a name for himself by hard work, pluck and solicita-
tion. To curry attention from the great Pennsylvanian economist by presenting him
with the fruit of Wells’s work, even if that work could not have been of any great
interest to him, and by adding a touch of ‡attery (“I hope you will …nd your reward
12in the adoption and practical application of your views by the masses of our people”
(ibid., April 8, 1858)) was to make at once a courteous gesture and an investment.
The investment yielded returns in the …nal year of the Civil War. Wells had
establisheda reputation as an author whoexcelledin presenting scienti…c argument to
nonscientists; the Unionwas inneed of exactly that skill in1864. The year before had
seen draft riots in New York City amidst a climate of heated criticism, in the public
and the press, of the war e¤ort. Copperhead organs like the World, the Express, and
the Journal of Commerce sought an armistice with the South in the face of mounting
deaths and commercial losses. Their editorial strategy, according to William Cullen
Bryant, editor of the Evening Post – another newspaper critical of the government,
but on the grounds that it was not prosecuting the war vigorously enough – was to
…x their attention on rebel successes in the battle…eld and bankruptcies and high
prices at home (Brown 1971, p. 450). To counter the anti-war propaganda Bryant
and several others formed the Loyal Publication Society, intended to disseminate
knowledge favorable to continuation of the war and directed towards “counteracting
the e¤orts of the advocates of a disgraceful and disintegrating Peace” (Wells 1864, p.
i). The Society needed someone to confront conclusively – if possible, scienti…cally –
the claim that the Union could not long bear the costs of war. George P. Putnam,
Wells’s employer in Pennsylvania a fewyears before, was on the Society’s Publication
Committee and knew just the right man (Ferleger 1942, pp. 8-9).
13“It has occurred to the writer,” Wells wrote in “Our Burden and Our Strength,”
which proved quickly to be the most popular of the Society’s pamphlets, “that good
and timely service might now be rendered to the country, by instituting a large and
accurate inquiry concerning our national ability – present and prospective – to pay
our maximum future debt, interest and principal.” That such a dry subject held the
interest of enough readers to warrant the printing of a quarter of a million copies in
six months is a testament at once to how much was at stake and to Wells’s power
of written persuasion. Optimism was necessary to sustain the war notwithstanding
enormous casualties. Optimism sent soldiers to the battle…eld and sold war debt.
Wells’s power to instill it rested in his capability, rare at the time, to marshal reams
of statistical data to convey with simplicity and force apparently objective, scienti…c,
irrefutable fact. If the national debt reached three billion dollars by 1865, an esti-
mate that raised alarm among Copperheads, Wells demonstrated that the country’s
circumstances would still be far from dire. He estimated the per capita wealth of the
restored Union would be $634.52; the per capita debt, $82. “Large though these pro-
portions may seem, yet applying them, practically, we should not consider the case of
an individual as particularly one for commiseration, whose debts and liabilities were
less than one seventh of his available assets,” he assured; “and if not the individual,
then certainly not the country, restored, renewed, reinvigorated, as it must be with
the terminationof the rebellion andextinguishment of Slavery” (Wells 1864, pp. 6-7).
14Still less should a rapidly growing population – including immigrants attracted by
the high wages resulting from a “permanent protective tari¤” – whose productivity
would be bolstered by the accumulation of capital and labor-saving technological
progress, panic over such a manageable debt (Wells 1864, pp. 13, 36). Following
thirty-eight pages of detailed proof of the point, he summed up,
Enough of statistics (which no partisan zeal can wrest from their true
meaning) have been given, to satisfy our readers that the country cannot
be destroyed, or even crippled, by any probable future debt; and to induce
every loyal man, as he re‡ects upon our resources as a nation, to “Thank
God and take courage.” (Wells 1864, p. 38)
In retrospect one error in Wells’s pamphlet stands out, and it is the parenthetical
remark above. Within …ve years Wells would be at the center of controversy that
is an exemplary case study of how partisanship – and corresponding di¤erences in
theoretical a¢nities – may bring the meaning of statistical evidence into dispute. But
in 1864 the only partisanship that mattered concerned the war; and with Republi-
cans mostly united on the war and unopposed in government, Wells’s pamphlet in
support of the war e¤ort was not only uncontroversial in Washington. It was widely
applauded, and Wells universally appreciated.
By spring of the next year Wells was made chairman of the newly-constituted
United States Revenue Commission, appointed to inquire into the best method “of
raising by taxation such revenue as may be necessary to supply the wants of the
15Government” (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 2). As the war drew to a close,
the immediate wants of the government diminished and the entire system of internal
and external revenue required revisiting. With respect to the external taxes, however,
revisiting them did not imply dismantling them, or even necessarily adjusting them
downward. From 1861 to 1865 the average tari¤, measured in Figure 1 as the ratio of
duties to all imports or the ratio of duties to dutiable imports, rose sharply from 14%
or 19% to 38% or 48%. One purpose of the rise was war …nance, but another was
protection for domestic manufactures (Taussig 1892, p. 162). Notwithstanding the
war’s end, therefore, adjustment of the tari¤ would be bitterly controversial. Wells’s
charge, Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch insisted, was “of more important
character than those which have been devolved upon any commission ever enacted
by this Government” (McCulloch to Wells, 24 March 1865, Wells Papers).
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
3 WELLS’S COMMISSION AND HIS CONVERSION
Wells’s …rst task was to …nd two fellow commissioners. He turned to Carey to ask
advice. He was also eager to signal his abiding commitment to protection. The com-
mission would generate a wealth of statistics and testimony that “would be worth
millions to the country”; but it would also “furnish arguments in favor of our views,
which it would be impossible to set aside by any mere declamation” (Wells-Carey
16letters, April 8, 1865). Wells wrote seven more times in the spring and summer of
1865 as he was preparing the ground for the Commission. On April 10 he mentioned
more candidates for the other two seats – and then, acknowledging receipt of Carey’s
recent book, added, “Please accept my thanks for the book – and fully believing in
you and your doctrines I shall endeavor to serve the country by carrying them out.”
On April 19 he wrote, “Now it does seem to me you ought to be able to recommend
some one from Penn.” And on May 9: “I have the pleasure of announcing to you that
the Secretary has o¤ered the appointment to Mr. [Stephen] Colwell, and I trust you
will see that he accepts it.” Colwell was another member of Carey’s Philadelphia
intellectual circle, an even more devoted adherent to his “American system” of polit-
ical economy than was Wells, and an eminent author on political economy in his own
right. Thus, as Wells began his work in 1865, his commitment to protection and to
Carey were …rm, and Carey’s in‡uence to the work of the Commission was secure.
Wells and Colwell were joined by Samuel S. Hayes, Comptroller of the city of
Chicago. Hayes was intended to balance regional interests: because he was an ac-
knowledged copperhead, he would represent both the West and the South. Wells
expected him “to be of no account anyway” (Wells-Carey letters, May 27, 1865) –
an expectation that was also the fervent hope of committed protectionists. Their
hope was mostly realized. The Commission solicited testimony, gathered data, and
wrote through the summer and fall of 1865. In January of 1866 the commissioners
17produced a report with speci…c recommendations for reform of the revenue system,
accompanied (in some cases shortly afterward) by thirteen “special reports” on the
conditions in and needs of particular sectors: cotton, sugar, distilled spirits, and so
on. Wells was responsible for the overall report and at least seven of the thirteen
special reports. Colwell authored four of the reports, including, most notably, those
of wool and woolens, iron and steel, and foreign trade. Hayes produced just one,
on petroleum. In consequence the report came to protectionist conclusions, albeit
moderately so.
Colwell’s contributions were the most unmistakably protectionist. In his Special
Report No. 10, “Upon the Relations of Foreign Trade to Domestic Industry and
Internal Revenue,” Colwell emphasized the necessity of sustaining manufacturing in-
dustry, promoting the diversi…cation of all industry, and achieving the attendant
technological externalities and productivity growth. “If diversity of production adds
so much to the productive power of a people,” he wrote, “and, by consequence, so
much more to their purchasing power, ... it is proper to consider what policy, on the
part of the government, will most promote diversi…ed industry, and secure its activ-
ity and continuance" (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 279). Colwell’s reasoning
was an unmistakable echo of Carey’s, and so was his prescription: heightened tari¤
protection for manufacturers. The need for such medicine, he believed, was urgent:
What it would have been always politic for the country to do has become
18indispensable now – a …nancial necessity. Our tari¤ must now not only
be adjusted to the di¤erence between the cost of labor abroad and at
home, but also to the burden of the internal duties levied upon home
products. This is nowa pressing duty. The complications and duplication
of taxes, arising from the great number of articles and occupations taxed,
has not only neutralized the foreign or custom duties, but in many cases
produced a heavy discrimination in favor of foreign labor. (U.S. Revenue
Commission 1866a, p. 283)
Wells agreed entirely with Colwell’s ends; he agreed, too, with the privileged
place reserved by Colwell for manufacturing industry; and he agreed with Colwell’s
protectionist principles. But he argued that protection could be achieved by di¤erent
means. He made the point by way of a brief review of the revenue system of Great
Britain. Wells acknowledged that the repeal of the Corn Laws had contributed to
British well-being. In his view, though, such acknowledgment upheld rather than
undermined protectionist principles. The Corn Laws contributed to the high price of
raw materials and of food, and so increased the cost of production of manufactured
goods, bene…ting foreign competitors. When the Laws were repealed, manufacturers
were able to combine domestic labor with cheap foreign raw materials, and thereby
produce and export goods at lower cost than could their foreign competitors. “This
principle is the key to British free trade ... but it may be gravely questioned whether
it is not protection in a more subtle form” (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 7).
In making his recommendations, therefore, Wells suggested that protection could
be achieved similarly in the United States by reducing costs of domestic manufac-
19turers; and that, he argued, could be achieved best, not by raising import tari¤s,
but by eliminating most of the labyrinthine system domestic excise taxes. “The rem-
edy, therefore, ... must, in the opinion of the commission, be sought for in such a
revision of the present internal revenue system as will look to an entire exemption
of the manufacturing industry of the United States from all direct taxation” (U.S.
Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 17). He and his fellow commissioners recommended
accordingly some changes to the tari¤ schedule – for instance, an increase in the tari¤
on cotton fabrics to compensate for one of the few proposed increases in excise taxes,
namely, the tax on raw cotton (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 83). But in
general they favored little revision of tari¤ rates. Instead they directed most of their
recommendations towards repeal of several particular excise taxes and a reduction by
…fty per cent of all others (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, pp. 37-41).
Two bills were drawn up in Congress in the Spring of 1866 based on the Commis-
sion’s report: …rst, a revision of internal revenue, and second, a tari¤ bill (Stanwood
1903, p. 146). The internal revenue bill was signed into law on July 13. The tari¤
was the subject of greater controversy. Once tari¤s entered the debate in Congress,
congressmen brought to the ‡oor petitions “praying for an increase of the tari¤” on
imported wines (by California and Illinois grape growers), imported wool (by citizens
Dutchess and Geneses Counties, New York), imported cigars (by Cornelius Cline,
an Ohio tobacco manufacturer) imported ‡ax (by several citizens of Ohio and New
20York), importedmanufactured goods in general (by Philadelphia manufacturers), im-
ported “time paper” (by the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce), imported steel (by
several citizens of Ohio), and so on (House Journal, 39th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 74,
156, 177, 244, 252). The resulting bill, H. R. 718, was titled “An Act to Provide In-
creased Revenue from Imports, and Other Purposes.” Most germane were the “other
purposes”: protection for the distressed petitioners.
In the midst of this debate over H.R. 718, Wells was caught in the horns of a
dilemma. He was, ostensibly, a protectionist, and must have been loath to alienate
himself from his allies in Pennsylvania and the administration that had appointed
him. Besides, the impetus for the bill was his own report. Yet in its speci…cs the
bill departed substantially from his recommendations. In his next report Wells would
have to comment, favorably or not, on the pending legislation: Secretary McCulloch
instructed him tomake the tari¤ the principal subject ofhis report tobesubmitted in
December of 1866. Nor could he delegate responsibility for the tari¤ work to another
commissioner, as he had done before: by a further act of Congress, the other com-
missioners had been removed and Wells was appointed sole “Special Commissioner
of the Revenue” (Wells 1867, p. 1).
Wells responded in a manner that would become characteristic of him over the
next two years. He stated as diplomatically as possible his disagreement with his
erstwhile allies over certain practical details, while avowing un‡agging allegiance to
21their principles. “As respects the House bill No. 718, now before the Senate,” he
wrote,
the commissioner respectfully asks of Congress its reconsideration, inas-
much as he believes it to be exorbitant in its rates, tending to further
in‡ationof prices, destructive of revenue and of what little or foreign com-
merce yet remains, and prejudicial to the general interests of the country.
And, in con…rmation of these conclusions he would add that admissions
have been made to him by representatives of many of the producing inter-
ests of the country likely to be a¤ected by this bill, that the rates of duty
imposed by it are higher than are necessary for the adequate protection
of their interests. (Wells 1867, p. 42)
Instead, he reiterated that “the relief now unquestionably needed and sought for
by the producinginterests of the country, shouldbe mainly givenby Congress through
a deduction of taxation on the raw materials indicated, and on the machinery and
results of domestic industry, rather than by an extensive and large increase of the
rates of duty on importations” (Wells 1867, p. 41). But “the question at issue,” he
insisted, “is not one legitimately involving any discussion of the principles of either
protection or free trade. On these points the policy of the nation may be considered,
for the present at least, as de…nitely settled” (Wells 1867, p. 40).
In the event, Wells’s wish for the tari¤ bill’s failure was granted – due not to his
persuasiveness but rather to a blunder by its proponents. The bill had been passed
by the House in late June of 1866, and passed by the Senate, with amendments, in
early February of 1867. In both instances large majorities favored it. By February,
22however, only one month remainedinthe 39th Congress, andthe necessary two-thirds
majority could not be mustered in the House to cease the lengthy discussion of each
separate amendment. The bill was dropped and aless sweeping one, concerning tari¤s
only on wool and woolens, was passed in its place (Stanwood 1903, pp. 151-158).
At least two contrary notions of Wells’s position on free trade versus protection
circulated in the spring and summer of 1867, and Wells was responsible for both of
them. His rea¢rmation of protection in general, while he urged reconsideration of its
particular manifestation in H.R. 718, came in late December, 1866. One month later,
at a special meeting of the American Social Science Association in Boston, Wells was
cited approvingly by the meeting’s two featured speakers, both of whom spoke out
for free trade: Williams College’s Arthur Latham Perry, the postbellum generation’s
foremost academic exponent of laissez-faire, andEdward Atkinson, the Boston cotton
goods manufacturer who had furnished Wells with valuable testimony and data for
his reports (New York Evening Post, Jan. 31, 1867). Atkinson presented a paper in
which he reported of Wells, “his convictions are evidently changing somewhat, and I
believe that a man of his ability, and with the opportunity which he has for observing
the evils of legislation for special interests, cannot long avoid being a convert to
the doctrine that free trade and not protection is the proper basis from which to
enact a tari¤ law for the collection of revenue” (Atkinson 1867, p. 13). Privately
corroborating Atkinson’s observation, Wells wrote to Perry in March to say that “I
23have been intending to write you for some time past and tell you con…dentially of the
change whichmy recent intimate connectionwith tari¤ legislationhas producedinmy
opinions, in respect to free-trade and protection. Frankly, I have become thoroughly
disgusted with the extreme views, which I once, and as you know quite recently,
thought it heresy to disbelieve” (Wells to Perry, March 11, 1867, cited by Ferleger
1942, p. 178).
In April, on the other hand, Wells wrote to Philadelphia to complain peevishly to
Carey about “a most persistent and determined e¤ort on the part of some to draw
me in with the ranks of the free traders,” and to express his determination “not to be
readout of the ranks of my old friends and supporters” (Wells-Carey letters, April 26,
1867). Two months later his determination was the opposite: he wrote to Atkinson
in Boston to give notice that “I have changed my ideas respecting tari¤s & protection
very much since I came to Washington & am coming over to the ground which you
occupy. I am utterly disgusted with the rapacity and sel…shness which I have seen
displayed by Penna. people ...” (Wells to Atkinson, July 17, 1866, Atkinson papers).
And two months after that, he declared to his distinguished Pennsylvanian mentor
that, notwithstanding a recent trip to England (the citadel of “British free trade,” as
Carey put it disdainfully) “you may be assured however that I have not turned free
trader” (Wells-Carey letters, Sept. 17, 1867).
Wells prepared Perry, at least, for his singular duplicity:
24The time has nothowever come from meto distinctly avowmy sentiments.
I am accumulating a store of facts, which private individuals could not ob-
tain, and which whenmade public will I think go very far towards settling
our future commercial policy. To provoke opposition now, would probably
close the door to some important investigations; so for the present I must
work on silently. (Wells to Perry, March 11, 1867, cited by Ferleger 1942,
p. 178)
What facts were Wells expecting to collect, and how long would he wait to come
out with them? His letter to Perry might be interpreted to mean that in his report for
1867 he planned tocontrast the information on high prices and exorbitant pro…ts that
he would gather from protectionists, who still con…ded in him, with data describing
more favorable economic conditions that he would observe during his fact-…nding
mission to free-trade England. With that possibility in mind, it is instructive to read
the Report for 1867.
In the Report, Wells avoided the tari¤ question – even obfuscated it – as never
before. The tari¤ was the central question of the report for 1866; in the Report for
1867 it is hardly mentioned in forty-nine pages of text. It appears on the eleventh
page, as follows:
In determining, moreover, for the future what shall be the average rate
of the tari¤, it is important to bear in mind that the practical question
presented is not so much what the respective advocates of free trade and
protection may desire, or what abstract economic science may teach, but
rather what under existing circumstances is most expedient. And, viewed
in this light, it seems certain that, with all its objectionable features, we
25have as yet devised no system, as a whole, which operates with so muchof
certainty and equality as the system of taxation levied through the tari¤.
(Wells 1868, p. 11)
In the context of the emerging tari¤ debate Wells’s comment was a platitude, and
an evasive one at that. Neither free traders, led by Perry, Atkinson, and Bryant,
nor protectionists, led by Carey, disputed that the tari¤ was, for the moment, the
most expedient means of raising revenue. The tari¤ question was two-fold: Should
tari¤ rates be set above the minimum required to meet the revenue needs of the
government? Should they be set above the rate which would maximize revenue?
Protectionists answered “yes” to at least one of those questions, and more commonly
both; free traders answered “no” to at least one, and more commonly both. Wells’s
foregoing comment in the report for 1867 addressed neither. In returning to the tari¤
in the report’s …nal paragraphs, he remarked only that he had originally intended to
address the tari¤, but begged leave to set the matter aside and consider it in a later
report (Wells 1868, pp. 48-49).
When at last he did so, the resulting reports for 1868 and 1869 were very di¤erent
from his earlier ones. In the Report for 1868, Wells argued that free trade was,
a priori, salutary. “In fact,” he wrote, “our present tari¤ is in many particulars
apparently based upon the old fallacy that, in the exchange of commodities between
nations, which constitute commerce, what one gains the other loses. It needs but a
moment’s thought tobe convinced that there canbe no permanent trade orcommerce
26unless it is for the gain of both nations” (Wells 1869a, p. 80). In the report for 1869
he found that the prevailing tari¤, which re‡ected “the will of highly organized and
aggressive associations of capitalists,” was “excessive and unnecessary, and opposed
alike to the highest interests of civilization and humanity” (Wells 1869b, p. 72).
Wells had come out unambiguously for free trade. Perry wrote him a congratula-
tory letter assuring that the report of 1869 “will be our Bible in our future onslaughts
on the monopolists” (Wells Papers, 31 Dec. 1869). Carey published a scathing rebut-
tal of the report, impugning Wells as a betrayer of American interests (and protec-
tionist principles, and Carey himself) for “Britishgold.” He opened with an epigraph:
Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went unto the chief priests,
and said unto them, ’What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto
you?’ And they covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver. And from
that time he sought opportunity to betray him. ... And forthwith he
came to Jesus and said ‘Hail, Master,’ and kissed him. – St. Matthew,
chap. xxvi. (Carey 1870, p. 1)
Like Carey, the protectionist majority in Congress felt double-crossed. After the
Report for 1869 Wells’s position was not renewed.
What caused Wells’s conversion to free trade? The question was discussed widely
at the time. His conversion became part of a story that Wells himself told, beginning
in 1870 andcontinuinguntil hisdeathin1898, as he proselytizedfor tari¤ reform. The
cause to be advanced here is not the most-cited one. Before the case for it is made,
27the others deserve a hearing. They will be designated (1) persuasion by evidence of
trade and wages; (2) aversion to special interests; (3) persuasion by economic theory;
(4) bribery; and (5) ‡attery.7
3.1 Evidence of trade and wages
In 1882, in a lecture in Brooklyn on the bene…ts of free trade, Wells recalled his
conversion in the late 1860s. “In 1867,” he said, “as Commissioner of the Revenue of
theUnitedStates, andafull believer in thedoctrine of protection, growingout of early
training in a family of New England manufacturers, I personally visited and studied
the leading industries in Europe.” One of the most widely understood arguments for
protectionat the time – and one towhich, we haveseen, Wells alluded in “Our Burden
and Our Strength” – was that protection supported high wages; or, put di¤erently,
that protection prevented American labor from su¤ering the impoverishment of the
7There is, arguably, a sixth: persuasion by evidence of trade and technology transfer. Henry
George, in his Protection or Free Trade ([1886] 1941, p. 168), observed that “Cases have occurred
in which British manufacturers, compelled by competition to adopt the latest improvements, have
actually sold their discarded machinery to be shipped to the United States and used by protected
Americans. It was his coming across a case of this kind that led David A. Wells, when he visited
Europe as Special Commissioner of Revenue, to begin to question the usefulness of our tari¤ in
promoting American industry.” George appears to have meant that protection induces Americans
to adopt hand-me-down foreign technologies rather than up-to-date foreign technologies, and so
keeps Americans a step behind the British. A di¤erent interpretation is that adopting hand-me-
downs is a means for Americans to keep close on British heels technologically – but the greater
is American protection, the more expensive are the hand-me-downs, so Americans are induced to
buy fewer of them. Protection therefore keeps Americans a long step behind the British instead of
merely a short step. Whichever of the meanings George intended, this sixth conversion hypothesis
is not as noteworthy as the aforementioned …ve. The evidence supporting it consists of only the
briefest mention by Wells (1869a, p. 74).
28“pauper labor” of Europe. Wells claimed that his fact-…nding mission to Europe
in 1867 brought about his conversion to free trade by refuting the “pauper labor”
argument with hard facts. “It exposed the falsity of the plea so constantly urged in
this country that American labor, by reason of its ability to earn higher wages than
the competitive labor of Europe, needs to be shielded and protected,” he explained.
For,
As I went – note-book in hand – straight from the factories and machine
shops of England to the factories and machine shops of the continent, I
found that, just in proportion as wages decreased, the demand for protec-
tion to domestic industry and the dread of British competition increased;
and that this was especially the case, whenthrough commercial depression
and scarcity of employment a supply of labor to the continental manufac-
turer was available at less than average rates. The revelation of this fact
was equivalent to a knock-down blow, planted right between the eyes, to
many of my previous economic ideas ... and I then and there took my
…rst step in conversion from protection to free trade. (Wells 1882, p. 20)
Because this was Wells’s own explanation of his conversion it warrants par-
ticular attention. But it also warrants skepticism. Ferleger (1942, p. 192) testi…es
that Wells was prone to misremember the chronology and signi…cance of events in his
own life even when doing so was not particularly opportune. In this case it certainly
was opportune. For Wells to claim that he was converted to free trade by “just the
facts” was to project exactly the image of himself that had established his reputation
for rectitude. Wells’s professional success – and his ambitions – depended on his
29being viewed as a meticulous chronicler and impartial analyst of statistical evidence,
regardless of the position it supported.
3.2 Aversion to special interests
Edward Stanwood, whose two-volume history of American tari¤ controversies (1903)
remains authoritative, wrote that in the period of Wells’s service “Washington had
come to be …lled with as …ne a band of plunderers as ever besieged a National
Congress: tax swindlers, smugglers, speculators in land grants, railroad lobbyists,
agents of ship companies, mingled with the representatives of industries seeking pro-
tection, until it seemed as if Congress was little more than a Relief Bureau” (p.
52). The comment comes from a historian who exhibited sympathy with protection-
ist arguments and the legislators who made them. Free traders took greater notice
and expressed more alarm. Upon the formation of the American Free Trade League
in January, 1866, its president, William Cullen Bryant, petitioned Congress against
protective duties in these terms:
Protectivetari¤s arecarried throughCongress by a combinationof private
interests; the sugar planter is won over by a duty greater than the cost
of producing sugar elsewhere; the iron-master, the cotton and woollen
manufacturers, receive severally their separate advantage in the way of
special favor to their occupations; and joining forces, they roll the unjust
law through to the wrong of all the rest of the people. ... Every farmer,
every planter, every laborer, every carpenter, mason, sewingwomen, every
worker in this country, every consumer, in fact, except the few who derive
30a pro…t from these petted occupations, is robbed daily and hourly, and
their earnings are put into the pocket of the favored few. (Bryant 1866,
p. 2).
Arthur Latham Perry, for reasons identical to Bryant’s and in the rhetorical tra-
dition of Cobdenism, referred to the bene…ciaries of protection as “monopolists.” We
have already seen evidence in the correspondence between Perry and Wells that Wells
was being won over by the same view.
3.3 Persuasion by theory
“Theory” was a term of special opprobrium in the American tari¤ debate of the
mid to late nineteenth century. An argument was persuasive if it was believed to be
“practical,” built on hard facts, and discounted if it hanged on “deductions.” By this
standard, Wells, given his aptitude for statistics, was a singularly persuasive author.
But as his conversion became apparent he was attacked increasingly by protection-
ists on the grounds that he had been seduced by pie-in-the-sky theory. After Wells
departed for Britain and the continent in the summer of 1867, Secretary McCulloch
relayed the fears of protectionists about the trip and presaged the arguments that
wouldbe wielded againstWells upon his return. “Some of our high-tari¤ menare very
apprehensive that you will become too much indoctrinated with free trade notions
by a visit to England, ” related McCulloch (Wells Papers, 12 July 1867). England
was the land of Cobden and Bright, those popularizers of free trade political economy
31who had brought about the repeal of the Corn Laws a generation earlier.
The reaction that McCulloch foreshadowed was delayed, but within a couple of
years it came in storm. In Congress William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, denounced Wells’s report for 1868. He railed
against “the Commissioner’s theory that our legislation is making the rich richer and
the poor poorer.” “His traveling expenses are at the cost of the Treasury,” Kelley
continued, “and he is surrounded by a competent clerical force, and that he should
have rested all his theories upon an array of facts so meager and so easily disproved
is, to say the least, not creditable to his industry and judgment.” But “happily for
the country they are so ‡agrantly and absurdly false that Mr. Wells deductions and
conclusions will be received but as the vain imaginings of a dreamy and indolent
theorist” (Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., pp. 118-120, italics mine).
Wells had anticipated the form of Kelley’s denunciation and had already prepared
his defense. He began his report for 1868 by insisting that he wrote it “with a view
not of establishing or con…rming any particular theory, but rather of determining,
through the collection of positive data, what policy in legislation is likely to prove
hereafter most advantageous to the revenue” (Wells 1869a, p. 1). But that was not
forceful enough. More so was the preface to his report for 1869: “these issues do
not at present involve either the theory of free trade or the fact of protection. The
questions arising are practical questions purely” (Wells 1869b, p. 71, italics mine).
32Like his claim that his conversion was brought about solely by the statistical
evidence, however, Wells’s disavowal of theory cannot be accepted on his word. His
reports contain ample traces of the theory whose in‡uence he denied.
3.4 Bribery
Carey likened Wells to Judas not only because he felt betrayed. He believed the
betrayal was bought. While William D. Kelley denounced Wells’s report for 1868 in
Congress, Carey did so in Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune in a series of thirteen
open letters to Wells. In the penultimate letter Carey asked,
Why is it that your report is so precisely in accordance with the views
and wishes of those great British ‘capitalists,’ who are accustomed, ‘in
their e¤orts to gain and keep foreign markets,’ to distribute money so
very freely among those of our people who are supposed to be possessed
of power to in‡uence public opinion? (Carey 1869, p. 55)
The editors of the New York Times, among others, understood that the question
was hardly innocent.
Now if this paragraph means anything it is intended to insinuate, if not
openly to charge, that the money of British capitalists has been distrib-
uted in this country to in‡uence legislation, and that Mr. Wells made
his recent report under and by reason of such in‡uence. ... If British
gold is ‡owing around in our midst, if Commissioner Wells has had his
pockets lined with it, we should like to know it. ... And if such evidence
cannot be produced, the public will surely be warranted in pronouncing
33that cause most weak, which needs to be supported by the use of such
groundless and contemptible insinuations. (March 22, 1869, p. 4)
History has taken the side of the Times in presuming Wells to be innocent of
the charge. British conspiracy was a common nineteenth-century trope, fed by the
memory of antebellum con‡icts between the United States and its former colonizer,
by the Civil War disputes over the Alabama and the Trent, and increasingly by
competition for commercial supremacy in foreign markets. It was employed not only
by Carey (although he was the master of it), and not only against Wells (Crapol 1973,
p. 22). Even Stanwood (1903, pp. 160-161), who considered the accusation of bribery
“not altogether inexcusable,” ultimately dismissed it. “No one,” he concluded, “after
the …rst outburst of anger and annoyance had passed, either then or subsequently
has doubted his perfect sincerity and probity.”
3.5 Flattery
A possibility less frequently entertained – because less damning – is that Wells was
bought neither by thirty pieces of silver nor by “British Gold,” as Carey believed,
but instead by a di¤erent currency. I have in mind Paul Samuelson’s (1962, p. 18)
aphorism that “the economic scholar works for the only coin worth having – our own
applause.”
In the letter that Rep. Griswold sent to Secretary Fessenden recommending Wells
34for a seat on the commission, he speculated that Wells’s motives were to do good for
the country and to “achieve some reputation for himself” (Ferleger 1942, p. 20). It
is likely that the reputation Wells might have achieved among protectionists, whose
ranks included many menofindustry but fewrenownedintellectuals saveCarey, could
not have satis…ed him as much as the reputation he earned among free traders. Wells
distributed his reports to men of in‡uence in Britain: W. E. Gladstone’s secretary
expressed the Prime Minister’s appreciation; the Cobden Club’s honorary secretary,
Thomas Bayley Potter, did likewise for his associates. Wells was invited during
his 1867 trip to a dinner of the Political Economy Club, whose august membership
included, for the most part, devout free traders (Wells Papers, undated, reel 8; Howe
1997, p. 115). All this must have made an impression on Wells. If he had once been
eager to please Henry Carey, it is plausible that he became at least as eager to earn
the appreciation of this larger and more distinguished company. Wells was further
encouraged, after his conversion, by his election in 1870 to the Cobden Club; by the
Club’s publication of several of his works; by his being lauded before its members as
“the leader of American Free Traders”; and by his appearance as the guest of honor
at the Club’s dinner of 1873, where, according to the minutes, he was “greeted with
loud cheers” (Cobden Club 1873, p. 40; 1874, p. 16; 1875, pp. 126-129).
The speech Wells gave to the Club while in the spotlight of its admiration lends
support to the hypothesis that his conversion was in‡uenced by ‡attery. Notwith-
35standing the pains he had taken to disavow, to an American audience, his fealty to
any “theory,” he was now pleased to report to his approving British audience on
“the recent progress in the United States in the direction of true economic theories”
(Cobden Club 1873, p. 41, emphasis added).
4 EDWARD ATKINSON AND THE COTTON TEXTILE INTEREST
All of the foregoing accounts of Wells’s conversion are true to some degree. Wells
was indeed persuaded by theory, as one of the conversion stories has it. He was also
persuaded by evidence, repelled by the interested appeals of some parties, ‡attered
by others, and even bribed (albeit trivially, as will be shown) by yet another. Rather
than adjudicating among the various accounts – or, more simply, letting the matter
rest there – an alternative will be suggested. It has the advantage of casting light
on the other accounts and showing where each is lacking. It illustrates how interests
may shape the development and acceptance of economic theory, and how, in turn,
theory shapes the interpretation of evidence and thereby the perception of interests.
It centers on Wells’s relationship with Edward Atkinson.
Atkinsonrequires a more thoroughintroduction. Hewas Wells’ssenior by only one
year, but by 1865 was already well established in Massachusetts business and politics.
In1851, at the age oftwenty-four, hewas appointedtreasurer ofOgdenMills, a cotton
goods manufacturer. He worked his way up to part-ownership in several mills. At
36the same time he became an active pamphleteer: an early and widely-distributed
work was “Cheap Cotton by Free Labor” (1861), in which he sought to demolish
the claim that cotton could only be raised in su¢cient quantity by slave labor, and
so to remove that particular source of reluctance to go to war. He formed a bond
with the president of the Loyal Publication Society, John M. Forbes, a Massachusetts
railroad executive and organizer of troops bound for service in the War. Forbes was
also a man of voice in the Republican Party and Atkinson’s channel to Washington.
Through Forbes, Atkinson anticipated the formation of the Revenue Commission and
sought to in‡uence its composition.
In early 1865 Atkinson’s correspondence with Forbes had mostly to do with two
things: cotton, and the appointments for Lincoln’s second term that would best serve
the interests of cotton manufacturers and the nation. So he complained to Forbes
about the excessiveness of duties on raw cotton; he also speculated about the possi-
bility of having George S. Boutwell appointed Secretary of the Treasury. Boutwell, a
Van Buren Democrat and Governor of Massachusetts before the organization of the
Republican party, had afterwards been appointed by Lincoln to be the …rst Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue in 1862. He served as such until 1863, when he resigned to
serve as a Republican congressman from Massachusetts. Atkinson thought Boutwell
would be a good choice for the Treasury: his experience and competence were valu-
able, of course, but equally so was his identi…cation with Atkinson’s interests. As an
37erstwhile Democrat, Boutwell was among those Republicans with an a skepticism of
high protection. Atkinson wishedthat Treasury o¢cials wouldbe skeptical of at least
some trade barriers: the war had interrupted the supply of cotton from the South to
New England cotton mills, increasing their reliance on imported Indian (or “Surat”)
cotton (Atkinson 1863, p. 5; U.S. Revenue Commission 1866b, pp. 20, 23). Iron and
steel for construction of mills, and machinery for the mills manufactured from iron
and steel, were also commonly imported from England and faced high import tari¤s.
It would be too much to say that, in 1865, cotton goods manufacturers were free
traders. It would be too much to say that even Atkinson was then a free trader.
Two years earlier, in his report on cotton manufactures to the Board of Trade in
Boston, Atkinson had said that “A steady tari¤, adjusted to the exact revenue point,
is certain for many years. More than this no skilful manufacturer desires or asks”
(Atkinson 1863, p. 21). At the time, in other words, Atkinson sought no more, but
also no less, than the “incidental protection” obtained from a revenue-maximizing
tari¤. His interest in installing a free trader in the Treasury Department was less
to obtain free trade than to ensure that, by way of low tari¤s levied on the inputs
to cotton manufactures, incidental protection would amount to e¤ective protection.
One year later, in a letter to the Hon. James G. Blaine of Maine, Atkinson stated
his position clearly:
Upon the general question of protection, my position is this. If we had
38never frameda tari¤ except for the simplepurpose ofcollectingrevenues, I
wouldnever do so, but inasmuch as we have in the past had tari¤s, framed
for protection, and our industry has thereby been forced into channels
which it would not have naturally followed, any change in policy must be
very gradual.
Second, no change should be made toward a reduction of duties upon
cottonmanufacturers or any other article unless ageneral change is made;
because in order to compete with England we must have access to her
machine shops and buy cheap machinery. We cannot make cotton goods
with machinery, in the manufacture of which the iron master and the
machinist have been protected, unless the cotton fabric be also protected.
Neither can we compete with England unless we have all our raw material
free of duty as she has.
Third, all our internal taxes must be o¤set by corresponding duties before
the duty begins to be e¤ective even to the point of the incidental protec-
tion o¤ered by a revenue tari¤. (Atkinson to Blaine, May 30, 1866, in
Williamson 1934, pp. 64-65)
In fact Atkinson lobbied for higher tari¤s on cotton manufactures. He just denied
that the increase would constitute “technical protection” if one accounted for inter-
nal taxes on domestic inputs and output and for tari¤s on imported inputs. As a
complementary strategy, in order to prepare for the possibility that tari¤s on cotton
manufactures would not be raised, he also sought lower excises on raw cotton and
lower tari¤s on machinery. His advocacy of Boutwell for Secretary of the Treasury
was part of that complementary strategy.
Boutwell did not get the position, which went instead to Hugh McCulloch. But
there would be more positions to …ll. Once in o¢ce McCulloch was solicitous of
Atkinson, writing to him to welcome his suggestions for appointments to the Rev-
39enue Commission. As withthe top Treasury post, Atkinsondid not see his …rst choice
appointed; but Wells, after his appointment as chairman, dutifully sought Atkinson’s
advice and opinions, and thereafter was even more solicitous of him than McCulloch
had been. From April 6, 1865 until the publication of Wells’s …nal report as Special
Commissioner in December 1869, Wells sent Atkinson no fewer than one hundred
letters. From the end of 1869 until the end of his life in 1898, the letters num-
bered an additional two hundred and ninety-one. Atkinson became Wells’s constant
correspondent and con…dant.
Atkinson also became Wells’s chief source of information and adviser on cotton
and cotton manufactures. In October 1865, under the auspices of the Commission,
Wells took testimony from Atkinson and …fteen other cotton planters, traders, and
manufacturers, and compiled the transcripts in a …fty-page appendix to his “Special
Report on Cotton,” one of the thirteen speci…c reports that accompanied or followed
shortly after the Commission’s general one. Atkinson’s testimony is by far the longest
and most detailed, consuming eleven and a half pages of text. Wells borrowed di-
rectly from it to compose his report.8 The result was a report favorable to cotton
manufacturing interests.
In one respect Wells’s recommendations were even more favorable to cotton man-
ufacturers than Atkinson requested or wished. Wells was intrigued by the possibility
8Compare, for example, the data on p. 77 of the U.S. Revenue Commission’s report (1866a) with
those on p. 21 of the testimony (1866b).
40of an export tax on raw cotton. Atkinson’s and others’ testimony indicated that the
United States had substantial market power in the market for raw cotton, especially
high-quality cotton. Approximately 88% of England’s imports of over one billion
pounds of cotton came from the U.S. in 1860. Three years after the war’s outbreak,
U.S. shipments had declined by 93%. Despite a tripling of the Egyptian supply, a
quadrupling of the Indian supply, and the cultivation of new crops in China, Japan,
Turkey, and elsewhere in Asia Minor, Englandwas able to consume only half as much
cotton in 1864 as it had in 1860. The hindrance was not only that alternative sources
were di¢cult to generate quickly on the necessary scale. The alternatives were imper-
fect substitutes for American cotton, which was of high quality and to which English
mill machinery had been specially adapted (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866b, pp.
6-7). Given the evidence of U.S. market power it was reasonable to anticipate that, if
the Constitutional ban on export taxes could be overcome, then such a tax would at
once decrease the domestic price of raw cotton paid by cotton manufacturers, raise
the foreign price and thereby improve the machinery-to-cotton terms of trade, and
garner revenue for the Treasury. Atkinson feared that an export tax would lead to
“sectional jealousy,” (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866b, p. 27) and therefore opposed
it. But Wells was enthusiastic about the idea and gave it a prominent place among
the recommendations in his report (U.S. Revenue Commission 1866a, p. 81). Less
imaginatively, but more realistically, he also suggested that the excise tax on cotton
41should be compensated by an increase in the tari¤ on cotton manufactures.
In short, Wells attended assiduously to cotton manufacturers in the Report for
1865. But withthe tari¤ bill stalled in the summer of1866, and with Wells’s mandate
from McCulloch to study the tari¤ schedule and the pending tari¤ bill for the report
for 1866, his e¤orts could not cease there.
A new contact in the summer of 1866 was Amos A. Lawrence, another cotton
manufacturer and member of the illustrious family that had endowed the school
where Wells received his scienti…c training. Wells’s handful of letters to Lawrence in
1866 sought advice for a tari¤ on cotton manufactures that would be acceptable to
the industry. On June 20, Wells wrote that the bill reported most recently gave, “on
knit cotton hosiery, a speci…c as well as an ad valorem duty. I think 30 cts per lb. &
35 p.c. ad valorem. If this is not satisfactory, write to me ...” (Wells to Lawrence,
June 20, 1866, Amos A. Lawrence Papers).
On July 9, Wells updated Lawrence on the progress of the tari¤ bill:
[T]he tari¤ bill now before the House will never become a law. ... If it
passes the House, it can only be savedby acomplete revision inthe Senate
committee – with the rates largely reduced. With a desire to serve your
interests, I wish you would draw so much of the bill as relates to cotton
hosiery anew, pushing the rates down to the very lowest you can stand ...
(ibid., July 9, 1866)
The correspondence is evidence of Wells’s commitment to cotton manufacturing
interests – but even stronger evidence is found in his Report for 1866. As stated
42previously, Treasury Secretary McCulloch instructedWells to devote special attention
in his report to the tari¤ question in order to guide Congress in debate over H.R.
718. In preparation, Wells solicited more information and suggestions from Atkinson
and Lawrence. One solicitation came in the form of a printed, but unsigned, six-page
document titled “Manufacture of Cotton.”
To a reader of the Report for 1866, the document is recognizable as a pre-print
of that section of the report concerning the tari¤ on cotton manufactures. What
is notable in it is what is missing. Wells left a few blanks in the pre-print that, in
the Report, are …lled in with data – most importantly, the data of his recommended
tari¤s on cotton fabrics. Speci…cally, the second paragraph reads in part,
In view of these facts, after providing for the imposition of speci…c duties
uponall woven cottongoods, aclause has beenadded providing that these
speci…c duties shall amount to at least ___ per cent upon brown, ___
per cent on bleached, and ___ per cent on printed cottons ...
The pre-print is found among Atkinson’s papers with a handwritten date (1866,
Sept.) and a message at the top of the front page: “Will Mr. Lawrence please make
any comments or suggestions and return to [signed] Edward Atkinson” (Atkinson
Papers, carton 14, folder "n.d. - Oct. 12, 1866"). The blanks are pencilled in with
“30,” “33 1/3,” and “25,” respectively.
It is impossible to tell whether Atkinson or Lawrence made the pencil marks.
But it hardly matters: what is at issue is the importance of cotton manufacturing
43interests to Wells’s thinking about the tari¤. Whichever of Wells’s con…dants made
the marks, he must have been entirely satis…ed three months later with the …nal form
of the Report, which suggested that “these duties shall amount to at least thirty per
cent. upon brown, thirty-three and a third per cent. on bleached, and thirty-…ve
per cent. on printed cottons” (Wells 1867, p. 46). We may assume that Lawrence,
whom Wells had asked particularly about hosiery (and received a free sample for his
inquiry), was especially pleased:
A moderate speci…c duty is recommended in addition to the ad valorem
rate upon cotton hosiery. This manufacture has been lately established in
the United States, and now employs a large number [of] operatives and of
capital. It has been started, moreover, upon machinery mostly imported
at very high cost, andrequires such attentionas the interestof therevenue
will allow. (ibid., p. 49)
Wells proposed these few increases in the context of a report arguing that, over-
all, the tari¤ rates under consideration of Congress in H.R. 718 were “exorbitant
..., destructive of revenue and of what little or foreign commerce yet remains, and
prejudicial to the general interests of the country” (Wells 1867, p. 42). The gravest
problems were the duties on raw materials and machinery. Wells’s report included
the form of a bill that the Senate Finance Committee took immediately under con-
sideration in early January, 1867, towards revision of the House legislation. Upon the
substitute bill, and the possibility of the Finance Committee’s wholesale adoption of
it, hung the hopes of his supporters.
44Table 1 presents the tari¤s on unbleached cotton fabrics (which Wells took to
exemplify cottons in general) and machinery in years of signi…cant tari¤ revision
prior to 1867. It also includes the tari¤s proposed in H.R. 718 as passed by the
House of Representatives in 1866; the tari¤s of Wells’s counterproposal to H.R. 718
as detailed in his report for 1866; those of the amended version of the bill passed by
theSenateon February 1, 1867; andthose ofthe House Ways andMeans Committee’s
proposed changes to the Senate version. Juxtaposing Wells’s bill with the tari¤ law
then in existence, and with the version of H.R. 718 that he had before him, reveals
how modest were his aims and how consistent they were with the protective system
as it had evolved to 1866.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Wells mostly agreed with H.R. 718 concerning the nominal protection to grant
to unbleached cotton goods. A lower duty of four cents rather than …ve should be
levied on fabrics of fewer than 100 threads per square inch, he determined – but
the di¤erence hardly mattered. Coarse fabrics did not constitute the bulk of cottons
consumed domestically (Wells 1867, p. 47), and they had long been an even smaller
share of imports (Irwin and Temin 2001, p. 791). Where Wells disagreed importantly
with the House bill was in protection for machinery. In 1866 the rate applying to
most machinery was 35%. H.R. 718 would have raised it to 45%; Wells wanted it
to remain at 35%. On January 3, 1867, Wells’s report was referred to the Finance
45Committee, which began to rework the legislation based on his design.
It is possible to pinpoint the moment at which Edward Atkinson became a com-
mitted free trader. On January 15, Wells reported to Atkinson on how the Finance
Committee was getting along with his bill.
Dear Atkinson,
Things do not look very satisfactory here. I am a¤raid [sic] the ex-
tremists & in‡ationists will have it pretty much their own way. The
machinery people are here asking 80 p.c. duties on machinery. The Com.
have raised from 35 to 45. The bill will probably come up in the Senate on
Thursday. With the best part of Congress my views …nd great favor but
special interests over ride all other considerations. ... (Wells to Atkinson,
Jan. 15, 1867)
Two weeks after receiving the letter Atkinson was in the company of Arthur
Latham Perry in Boston, at the special meeting of the American Social Science Asso-
ciation mentioned previously, …ring his …rst salvo unmistakably in favor of free trade.
He read a paper titled “On the Collection of Revenue” that he must have begun
writing immediately upon hearing the news from Wells. On January 25, anticipating
what he would say in Boston, he reported to Wells, “I have …nally planted myself on
British Free Trade” (Atkinson to Wells, Jan. 15, 1867, in Ferleger 1942, p. 181).
465 EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
Atkinson was convinced that e¤ective protection for cotton manufacturers could not
be obtained through a nominally protectionist policy. So long as the protectionist
principle underlay the tari¤ schedule, cotton manufacturers would have to battle for
their protectionalong withevery other industry – and there wouldnever be assurance
of getting enough of it to o¤set the higher cost of inputs after the suppliers got theirs.
Thus Atkinson reported to the Boston conferees that in recent attempts to build a
new tari¤ law, “each man put in his brick, until the whole structure became absurd
and ridiculous” (Atkinson 1867, p. 46). The muddle proved that the nation needed
a tari¤ founded upon a “…xed principle.” Atkinson favored a gradual approach. The
principleto beappliedimmediately was merely thatthetari¤shouldpromoterevenue,
not protection; in this respect the di¤erence between his former position and his new
one was rhetorical more than practical. The greater di¤erence was in the principle to
be applied ultimately – free trade – and the …rmness of his commitment to it. “Free
Trade increases the abundance of commodities, gives to each the relative share which
his education, skill or capital entitle him to, andleads to the harmonious development
of the powers of all” (p. 50), even the powers of New England manufacturers.
Was Atkinson’s conviction of the fruitlessness of higher tari¤s for e¤ective pro-
tection valid? The answer depends on how “e¤ective protection” is de…ned and
measured. The work cannot be left to Atkinson alone. He did not use the term, did
47not de…ne fully the terms he did use, and his measurements of them were back-of-
the-envelope. We have seen him refer to the conditions in which “the duty begins to
be e¤ective” (Atkinson to Blaine, May 30, 1866, op. cit.), but they are not exactly
equivalent to e¤ective protection as de…ned and measured in the present day. The
“e¤ective protection rate,” with no modifying pre…x, has been understood in roughly
the past half century to mean the increase in the value added per unit output of
an import-competing activity as a percentage of the value added per unit under free
trade.9 A tari¤ on the activity’s output could foster e¤ective protection if it were not
o¤set by tari¤s on intermediate inputs. Atkinson’s favored terms – the “real duty”
(Atkinson to Blaine, May 30, 1866, op. cit.) and the “net duty” (Atkinson 1867, p.
45) – correspond in his narrowest use of them to what Max Corden (1971, p. 33)
calls the “adjusted nominal rate.” Given the close relation of the latter term to the
e¤ective rate, however, and given also Atkinson’s intimations of broader meaning, we
have thus far interpreted him to be concerned about “e¤ective protection.” Suppose
we continued to do so, now heedful of the de…nition stated above. Atkinson’s convic-
tion might be put to test by asking: Was e¤ective protection for cotton manufactures
indeed negative? If not, was it perhaps positive but falling?
G. R. Hawke (1975) estimates e¤ective rates of protection for several U.S. indus-
tries in 1879, 1889, 1899, and 1904. To illustrate his method and its complications,
9Max Corden (1971, p. 246) traces the idea expressed by the term thus de…ned to James Meade
(1955), among economists working in English, and at least one earlier author in German. Corden
himself (1966) contributed much to the idea’s development and dissemination.
48take a convenient example from Corden (1966, p. 229). Let the price of a unit of
textiles under free trade be $1, of which sixty cents is paid for intermediate goods –
yarn, Corden supposes – so that forty cents is the value added by weaving. Now let a
forty percent tari¤ be levied on textiles while yarn remains duty free. If the country
is a price-taking textile importer, the price of textiles will rise to $1.40. If the price
of yarn is assumed to remain sixty cents, and the amount of yarn per unit of textiles
does not change, then the value added by weaving rises from forty to eighty cents.
The value added per unit of textile output is now one hundred percent greater than
that under free trade, so the e¤ective rate of protection is one hundred percent.
If the forty percent tari¤ is levied next on yarn as well as textiles, and the same
(or analogous) assumptions hold as before, then the price of yarn rises to eighty-four
cents and the value added by weaving falls to …fty-six cents. The value added per
unit of textile output is now only forty percent greater than that under free trade, so
the e¤ective rate of protection falls to forty percent. The e¤ective rate could fall still
farther – into negative territory if, in this example, the tari¤ on textiles is held steady
at forty percent while the tari¤ on yarn is raised to sixty-seven percent. Substitute
machinery for yarn and this last possibility represents approximately Atkinson’s fear.
Hawke’s estimates do not appear to validate the fear. The average nominal tar-
i¤ rate on cotton goods was 39% in 1879, 46% in 1889, 43% in 1899, and 37% in
1904. The e¤ective rates were 126%, 286%, 165%, and 238%. Although data from
49the 1860s are lacking, and “cotton goods” is a large aggregate that includes manu-
factures beyond Atkinson’s immediate concern, Hawke’s estimates lead one to think
that the e¤ective protection rate for cotton textiles in the last few decades of the
nineteenth century was positive, substantially higher than the average nominal rate,
and generally rising.
On the other hand there are reasons to doubt the validity of the estimates. What
is more, even if there were no such doubt, there is reason to question their relevance;
and even if there were no suchquestion, there is reason to think that Atkinson’s belief
was well founded even if it proved to be inaccurate.
One problem concernsthe treatment of the amount ofyarn(or machinery) perunit
of textiles. The proper amount of intermediate input per unit output for construction
of the e¤ective protection rate is the amount that would be found under free trade.
But that amount is not known. The best one can usually do is to observe or infer the
amount found under the giventari¤ structure. If the amount of yarn per textile never
changes regardless of the tari¤ structure, this complication is of no concern – hence
the assumption in the foregoing example. But the amount does change. To draw
again from the same example, when the tari¤ is levied on yarn as well as textiles,
the textile manufacturer can be expected to use less yarn per unit output than he
wouldunder free trade. If this smaller amount ofyarn is used to estimate the e¤ective
protection rate, the value added of weaving will be in‡ated and the estimate of forty
50percent will be biased upward (Corden 1966, p. 235).
Another problem arises from the transfer of resources from industries a¤orded the
least protection tothose a¤orded the most. Non-traded goods, in particular, will have
lowrates of e¤ective protection and should be expected to contract. As they contract
their prices will rise. Evenif the higher prices of non-tradables do not compel revision
of the e¤ective protection rates in tradable goods industries, the relevance of those
estimates may be questioned. E¤ective protection is requested and granted, presum-
ably, for the bene…t of capital owners and workers in the protected industries. The
bene…ts are fewer when non-tradables are more costly. Mill shareholders’ dividends
and weavers’ wages buy less when the prices of school lessons, circuses, telegraph
transmission and train tickets rise. Perhaps e¤ective protection, as de…ned above, is
not the appropriate measure of protection.
An alternative to e¤ective protection, which Corden (1966, pp. 225-226) calls
“net” e¤ective protection, measures an industry’s protection relative to non-traded
goods. Estimation of the net rate is more di¢cult because it requires, as a …rst step,
estimation of the substitutability of importables and non-tradables in production
and consumption. The more substitutable they are, the more a given rate of nominal
protection will cause resources to be transferred from non-tradables to importables
and the greater will betheimplicit tax on exporters. Irwin(2005, pp. 13-14) estimates
a substitutability parameter for the period 1879-1913, and with it …nds that when
51the average nominal tari¤ was 45 percent (a good approximation for the late 1860s as
well as the later period), the implicit tax on exportables was 21 percent, the price of
non-tradables was up 27 percent relative to free trade, andthe net e¤ective protection
rate was a modest 14 percent.
Irwin interprets the low net e¤ective rate as being consistent with “the continual
press by manufacturers for ever higher levels of nominal protection” throughout the
late nineteenth century (2005, p. 14). His interpretation has value, but there is
another side to the coin. When captains of an industry perceive their net rate of
e¤ective protection to be unacceptably low, one response is to lobby for higher levels
of nominal protection. Another is to decide that a nominal increase is exactly what
was tried in the past and resulted in the unacceptably low net rate, and to chart a
di¤erent course. Irwin’s …nding is consistent not only the …rst response, but also the
second.
One can say more. Atkinson’s conviction is appraisedmost aptly by consideration
of the net rate for a reason other than the methodological problems with the e¤ective
rate and the consistency of the Irwin’s …nding with Atkinson’s agitation. Speci…cally,
Atkinson’s own understanding of the reason why protection fails to protect is evoca-
tive of the net rate. He insisted that protection increases costs not only to buyers of
the protected products, but also economy-wide: “if perfect and equal protection were
practicable, it would simply result in a general rise in prices and wages” (Atkinson
521867, p. 49). Rising costs were cause and paralyzing consequence of the diversion
of resources from their “natural channels” (p. 41). The industries that were most
hobbled by the diversion were those of exports and non-tradables, but the malady
was more general. The quintessential case was just outside the window.
I think Boston to-day a¤ords a good illustration of the evils of protection.
The conditions of soil, climate and coast, indicated maritime pursuits as
the province of New England men: and she engaged in them chie‡y until
the South forced a protective tari¤ upon the country. As this destroyed
commerce, NewEnglanddevelopedtextile manufacturesbefore theirtime,
and then, becoming converted to the doctrine of protection, continued to
foster them by the same process. The result is, that a large amount of
the capital, and a large amount of the business capacity of Boston which
should have been applied to railroads, steamships and commerce has gone
into manufactures; consequently, Boston commerce declines, and young
men emigrate. (Atkinson 1867, p. 37)
Atkinson may have been too pessimistic about the prospects for cotton manu-
factures under a nominally protective policy. Although Irwin’s estimate of the rate
of net e¤ective protection for manufactured goods in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century is surprisingly low, it is su¢ciently large to represent a transfer of
resources equal to about two and a half percent of GDP from consumers to import-
competing industries (2005, pp. 16, 26). To stack the deck of argument against
Atkinson, let us suppose that cotton manufacturers were equal bene…ciaries of the
largesse. The fact remains that the favorable outcome is learned in hindsight. It was
53not obvious in advance. The political winds came to favor a more escalated tari¤
structure, de…ned as one with higher tari¤s on …nished goods than on intermediates
and raw materials (Corden 1971, pp. 59-60), so that industries’ nominal tari¤ rates
became an increasingly accurate guide to their relative e¤ective rates (Hawke 1975,
p. 98) and to a lesser extent their net e¤ective rates. But the winds could have
blown di¤erently – and so they appeared to be doing in the late 1860s. Especially
at that moment, reasoned projections for the cotton manufacturers’ prospects under
protection could di¤er. Atkinson’s endorsement of “British Free Trade,” while daring
and broad-minded, was neither rash nor disinterested.
6 WELLS’S CONVERSION
Wells’s avowed privately his allegiance to Atkinson’s new principles in the spring and
summer of 1867. Through February and even early March, however, he remained
committed to improving the legislation under debate, not denouncing it as his con…-
dant had done and plumping for an entirely new policy. When H.R. 718 passed the
Senate with amendments on February 1, Wells forwarded the bill to Atkinson solicit-
ing once again suggestions for revisions. The need to reconcile the House and Senate
versions meant another opportunity to tune the bill. Atkinson, who had just de-
nounced it in Boston as an “absurd and ridiculous” attempt at protection that failed
to protect, declined the opportunity testily: “I don’t need to examine this abortion
54as I have followed it closely in the Congressional Globe. I think you have but one
thing to do. Defeat it if you can” (Atkinson to Wells, Feb. 6, 1867, Atkinson letter-
books). More than advice, Atkinson included a template, complete with salutation
and signature, for the admonishment that he proposed Wells should deliver to the
Senate and the change of policy he should herald. “This attempt to meet exceptional
di¢culty by speci…c legislation has failed and it is believed that any further attempt
will be equally futile. ... It therefore only remains for me to treat the subject upon
broad principles to which special interests must adapt themselves even at the cost of
temporary injury.” The broad principles were, of course, those endorsed by Atkinson
the week before.
Wells agreed that the “speci…c legislation” was bad, but not that it was hopeless.
The bill would go through a …nal revision. Perhaps some cobbling would make it,
if not conducive to the common good, at least not damaging to New England man-
ufacturers. “I think as long as we are giving it, we may as well give everybody all
they want,” Wells replied to Atkinson. The duties on hosiery were obviously insuf-
…cient to compensate for rising costs, for example, so Wells would recommend they
be doubled. He pressed Atkinson once again to look over the bill, at least the part
pertaining to cottons. “Tear out the leaves of the bill write your corrections on them
and send to me by return mail,” Wells entreated. “If the tari¤ bill fails,” he granted,
“I should have no objection to put forth the programme indicated in your note of
55Friday. Indeed I have had nearly the same idea in my mind for some time” (Atkinson
papers, Feb. 10, 1867).
That the tari¤ bill did fail, and that it was followed quickly by narrower legislation
to protect wool and woolens, has already been recounted. Still Wells hesitated to
follow through with Atkinson’s proposal. To the contrary he redirected his e¤orts
towards passageof the wool and woolens bill, consideredby posterity “agreat triumph
for the protective principle” (Stanwood 1903, p. 145). Wells’s intervention earned
him the gratitude of the wool manufacturers (ibid., p. 149) and the task of justifying
his behavior to Atkinson. He confessed that President Johnson probably would not
have signed the bill had he not talked him into it; “but I found that there was an
intense feeling among many of the Western members on the subject, and I was afraid
that if it were not signed the whole subject of the tari¤ would have come up again
this week, in which case we might get a worse bill, and an inde…nite prolongation of
the session” (Wells to Atkinson, March 5, 1867). In his next letter to Atkinson, one
day later, apology gave way to remorse. “The wool bill is about as bad as it well can
be,” he wrote. “I feel more despondency for the future than any time since I have
been in the work” (Wells to Atkinson, March 5, 1867).
This was the moment of Wells’s conversion to free trade. It involved no epiphany,
nor did it occasion changes in the policies Wells advocated overtly. Rather than a
shift of his ideas the moment could be said to mark an in‡ection of their course. The
56change of direction was hardly discernible except to Wells’s close con…dants, for what
changed was the ideological position with which he aligned himself and his future
policy objectives, not his present ones. Atkinson’s statement in “On the Collection
of Revenue” of the di¤erence between a protectionist and a free trader describes well
the change in Wells:
The protectionist would say, twenty-…ve to thirty per cent net duty gives
us all we want; and the free trader would say, We advocate for the present
twenty-…ve to thirty per cent net duty for the purpose of obtaining rev-
enue. The result is the same, but it is of the utmost importance that we
start from the free trade rather thanthe protective point of view. The free
trader cannot be swerved from a uniform system, because he looks upon
the whole thing as a necessary evil; but the protectionist is constantly in
danger, because he thinks he can confer a bene…t and is therefore at the
mercy of each special interest. (Atkinson 1867, pp. 45-46)
In order to win over disa¤ected protectionists, Atkinson minimized the di¤erences
between his purpose and theirs. A tellingly understated phrase is “We advocate for
the present.” A free trader could concede, temporarily, plenty of ground for political
expediency – but important di¤erences still remained between him and a protec-
tionist. The di¤erences consisted not in where he stood, but in his destination and
compass.
So they did for Wells in March, 1867. The change is evident nonetheless in his
correspondence. Wells was “thoroughly worn out” from the trials of winter and early
springandset his hopes for recuperation on atripto Britain and Europe. What began
57as a plannedconvalescence, however, soon took an altogether di¤erent shape. A letter
from the Chancellor of the Exchequer invited “acquaintance and conversation” (Wells
to Atkinson, March 16); a new purpose dawned, and Wells’s energies rebounded. He
wouldtravel not as a tourist, but as an emissary of the United States government. He
wouldvisit, besides cathedrals andU.S. consuls, manufacturingdistricts andmembers
of Parliament.
In Wells’s letters from this period his excitement is palpable – and so are his in-
tentions. He solicited William D. Allison of Iowa, a Republican known for bucking his
party and becoming its most ardent tari¤ reformer, to join him (Wells to Atkinson,
March 16, 18, 22; Stanwood 1903, p. 171). He implored Atkinson to do the same:
“my whole scheme is based on your participation in it – a councellor & friend” (Wells
to Atkinson, March 21). Although Atkinson could not break away from Boston for
the summer he encouraged the scheme, which he expected would yield “ammunition”
for the “big …ght” they would face together after Wells returned (Atkinson to Wells,
July 23). Wells’s preparations for the …ght included, in addition to the “fund of
information” he would collect abroad (Wells to Atkinson, March 18), saturation of
selected areas with Atkinson’s pamphlet. On his way from Washington towards em-
barkation in New York, Wells targeted Philadelphia: “Carey says tis all twaddel!!” he
reported mirthfully to Atkinson (Wells to Atkinson, May 2). In England, from such
distinguished Cobdenites as William Newmarch, George Goschen, Walter Bagehot,
58Edward Watkin, and John Bright, he anticipated a more favorable response (Wells
to Atkinson, July 6).10
Wells’s choice of a new lodestar in the spring of 1867 was one decision. To ac-
knowledge it openly was quite another, and through all of 1867 and even most of
1868 he was unwilling to make it. In December of 1867 he asked Atkinson not to
commit him publicly to free trade or a revenue tari¤. “I may agree entirely with you
in opinion,” Wells explained, “and yet not think it advisable to provoke opposition
& thus weaken my in‡uence for good in other matters” (Wells to Atkinson, Dec. 24,
1867, Atkinson Papers). Thus Amos A. Lawrence, who resisted Atkinson’s agitation
for free trade, o¤ered Wells as late as June, 1868, a lucrative position as secretary of
a newly-formed trade association of cotton manufacturers and planters (Lawrence to
Wells, June 13, 1868, Wells Papers). Had he known Wells’s determination he would
have balked at making the o¤er.
The “good in other matters” that Wells hoped to do, and that explained his
outward reticence, was less likely the collection of any more information than what
he might accomplish as Secretary of the Treasury. November 1868 held the prospect
of General Grant’s election to the Presidency, and his inauguration the following
March would bring a new cabinet. Wells bid his friend James Gar…eld to in‡uence
Grant to give him the o¢ce. As of early November, Wells had the support not only
10Howe (1997) includes references corroborating the free-trade credentials of each of these contacts
of Wells’s in England.
59of Gar…eld, a moderate protectionist, but also that of such stalwarts as James G.
Blaine and reformers like Atkinson. “The Treasury is drifting to me inevitably,” he
determined (Ferleger 1942, pp. 221-222). But the coalition Wells had assembled in
his favor was fragile. None of his good deeds for the party during the fall campaign
would prevent its disintegration if he were associated unambiguously with Atkinson’s
view, which was clearly a minority one within the party.
Yet Wells had another report to write. To elide the tari¤ question for the second
year in a row would be hard to reconcile with the expectations of the free traders,
including Arthur Latham Perry, John Bright and his compatriots, and above all
Atkinson, whom he had persuaded to consider him an ally in their cause. His own
conscience too may have nagged him. Atkinson had urged him at last “to speak
out and tell the whole truth” (Atkinson to Wells, June 20, 1868, Wells Papers). An
apology for doing any less, like the one he pro¤ered in early 1867 for the wool and
woolens bill, would be vastly harder to make in late 1868 and harder for Atkinson to
swallow. As the report took shape in mid November, Wells lamented to Gar…eld of
how “vexatious of spirit” his position had become. But having found the courage to
write decisively, he took pride in the report’s boldness and pledged not to change a
line of it, “even if I knew it would make me gain or lose the Treasury” (Ferleger 1942,
pp. 223-224).
The notion that the document might gain him the Treasury could not seriously
60have been entertained. There was ample material in it to bring about the opposite
result, however. The existing tari¤, Wells wrote, “while professing to protect Amer-
ican industry, really, in many cases, discriminates against it” (Wells 1869a, p. 34).
It attempted “indiscriminate or universal protection” – an impossibility that, in the
e¤ort to achieve it, rendered “all protection a nullity” because every industry’s out-
put was another’s raw material (pp. 34-35). The consequences were felt beyond the
import-competing sector. Domestic goods were more costly across the board, and
exports were sti‡ed: “We have so raised the cost of all domestic products that ex-
change in kind with all foreign nationals is almost impossible” (p. 49). Shipbuilding
was a case in point; cotton manufactures were another. Before the war, production
of American coarse cotton goods was thriving and they were even exported to the
East and South America. All that was wanted to revive the industry was a reduction
of tari¤s and excises. Such a reduction, Wells claimed,
would determine the exportation of no small part of the cotton grown
in the United States in a manufactured, rather than in an unmanufac-
tured condition; would erect two cottonmills where one nowexists; would
largely increase the demand for agricultural produce in the home markets,
and would bring back four-fold that commerce of the ocean which now
wanes almost to annihilation, in great part through want of legitimate
occupation in e¤ecting exchanges (p. 78).
Wells’s report for the year 1868 amounted to a restatement, with statistical and
anecdotal elaboration, of the core of Atkinson’s “On the Collection of Revenue.” In
61the connection he drew between protective tari¤s and generally rising costs (which
in turn, he argued, were detrimental at once to exports, agriculture “in the home
markets,” and even the ostensibly protected industries) is the main substance of the
net protection idea. In his occasional doctrinaire interjections – e.g., “Government
can add nothing to the capital of the country by legislation. It can only prescribe the
channels into which capital already created shall ‡ow” (p. 77) – is evidence belying
his disavowal of allegiance to “any particular theory” (p. 1) and manifesting his
adoption of Atkinson’s. In his statement that moderate protection was “certainly, for
the present, the policy best suited to subserve the industrial interests of the country”
(p. 66) is the same concession to the opposition that Atkinson was willing to make,
and the same strategically understated quali…cation.
The preeminence of the quali…cation over the concession is discernible in Wells’s
concluding recommendations. In addition to the replacement of ad valorem with
speci…c duties he proposed the enlargement of the duty-free list, the reduction of
some rates (and, in exceptional cases, the raising of a few) in order to garner revenue,
and the reduction of yet more “with a view to an absolute abatement, on the simple
ground that the reduction of a duty is the reduction of a tax, and that the most
e¢cient method of protecting home industry is by the removal of obstacles in the
form of taxes” (p. 80). On that ground Atkinson had called for a tari¤ based upon
a “…xed principle,” or a “broad principle”; in the same fashion Wells deplored the
62United States’ establishment of “a tari¤ based upon small issues rather than upon
any great national principle” (p. 34).
Republicans in Congress were decidedly unwilling to replace protection with the
great national principle that Atkinson andWells had in mind. The reaction to Wells’s
Report for 1868 by House Ways and Means Committee chairman William D. Kelley
has already been related. Kelley, however, did more than denounce Wells’s report as
the work of an indolent theorist, and worse, the perpetrator of a fraud (Cong. Globe,
Feb. 4, 1869, Appendix p. 117). He tried to suppress its printing (ibid., p. 116)
and then to withhold Wells’s salary (Gar…eld to Wells, Feb. 24, 1869, Wells papers).
Wells’s aspirations to the Treasury would not be realized, and even his tenure as
Special Commissioner would extend only one more year.
Havingnothingto lose, in his …nal report Wells propounded“the true principles of
tari¤ reform.” The existing tari¤ was utterly destructive of commerce and industry
(Wells 1869b, p. 72); speci…cally, “whatever advantage is temporarily gained by
stimulating industries into an unnatural growth and development, is subsequently
more than compensated for by a resulting waste and misapplication of both capital
and labor” (Wells 1869b, p. 107).
Wells and Atkinson remained dedicated to the interests of cotton manufacturers,
but the free trade doctrine that they endorsed yielded a new perception of those
interests. Their perception di¤ered from that of others in the industry: the same
63association that once o¤ered Wells $6000 annually now lashed out publicly against
him. Wells complained privately to Amos Lawrence that the animus of certain cotton
manufacturers was unfair, for he had “resisted, and successfully, every proposal to cut
down unfairly the duties of cotton goods of every description” (Wells to Lawrence,
April 29, 1870, Lawrence Papers). He responded publicly in the Boston Advertiser
that
my earnest desire is that all manufactures should be allowed an equal and
a fair opportunity for development; but when three or four branches of
manufactures out of many hundreds arrogate to themselves the exclusive
title of “manufactures” I deny their right. The makers of clothing are as
truly manufacturers as the makers of cloth; the steel users are as truly
manufactures as the steel makers; the railroad is as much a productive
power as the pig-iron furnace; the mechanic as much a manufacturer as
the owner of a cotton mill. Let each have an equal right and be entitled to
legal protection without discrimination, and it is my belief that by such
an equality and free opportunity, the country will most readily secure the
most rapid and prosperous growth, and the greatest diversi…cation in its
industry. (Wells 1870)
At the end of his commission Wells was convinced, as he had been at the start,
that the interests of cotton manufactures were aligned with the national interest. The
di¤erencewas that heused to believe both sets of interests to be served by discrimina-
tory duties; now he believed they were served by the principle of non-discrimination.
Depending on his audience he would sometimes associate that principle with “pro-
tection,” as he did in his letter to the Advertiser. But neither protectionists like
64Henry Carey nor free traders like those of the Cobden Club mistook his meaning.
Wells proposed, as he announced in his toast as honored guest of the Cobdenites,
Free Trade (Cobden Club 1873, p. 71).
7 CONCLUSION
Histories of a nineteenth-century political …gure’s conversion of commercial thought,
the political interests that supported it, and the doctrine that drew vitality from it,
arecommon. But they arenotcommonly American. Several concern SirRobertPeel’s
turn towards repeal of the Corn Laws and the ascendancy of free trade in Victorian
England. The United States tari¤ controversy would seem a less likely setting for
such a history, perhaps because no participant of Peel’s stature was converted, or
perhaps because in this case the partisans of Peel’s side lost the battle. Protection
reigned in the United States from the Civil War through the rest of the nineteenth
century and until the eve of the First World War.
To authors of the most recent accounts of Peel’s conversion, however, the inci-
dent’s relevance lies in its suitability as a study of the contributions of ideas and
interests to political action. David A. Wells, Chairman of the Revenue Commission
and Special Commissioner of the Revenue from 1865 to 1870, lacked Peel’s power
and accomplishment, but his conversion to free trade is equally relevant. Wells’s in-
‡uence to policy was indirect but substantial. As Commissioner of the Revenue he
65drafted the nation’s commercial legislation, and in the decades after his appointment
he was, as Henry Steele Commager (1950, p. 230) summed up, “advisor to a whole
generation of statesmen.” His in‡uence to popular political debate was just as great.
Proselytizing proli…cally in books, articles, and speeches, Wells became one of the
foremost advocates of free trade in the last third of the nineteenth century.11
Wells’s conversion involves a peculiar twist. As with Peel, cotton manufacturing
interests were crucial. Yet the allegiance of English cotton manufacturers to free
trade is easy to understand because England was a large net exporter of cotton
goods. The United States, to the contrary, was a large net importer. The story of
how cotton manufacturing contributed to the development and dissemination of free
trade doctrine in the postbellum United States is thus an unexpected one.
Wells’s identi…cation of his own interests and the nation’s with those of cotton
manufacturing is evident in correspondence between Wells, Edward Atkinson, Amos
A. Lawrence, and others. Half a century and more in the past, when Wells’s name
was better remembered in American economic and political history, several stories
were told of the causes of his conversion. The purpose here has been to demonstrate
that the unacknowledged but more important cause was Wells’s relationship with
Edward Atkinson, and Wells’s and Atkinson’s mutual wish to grant e¤ective protec-
tion, or net protection, to cotton manufacturers. The story of Wells’s conversion that
11Joyner (1939, pp. 223-229) o¤ers a partial bibliography of seventy-four articles, reports and
books authored by Wells. He also refers to a comprehensive collection of Wells’s works in twenty-
three bound volumes, of which only two sets were produced.
66unfolds in the demonstration is not one that disentangles and assigns weights to the
contributions of theory and interests, but rather one that shows how each determined
the other.
In her study of ideas and interests in the history of U.S. trade policy, Judith Gold-
stein (1993, p. 3) rejects an understanding of ideas as “mere ‘hooks’” for interested
political entrepreneurs to lure support from constituents. She prefers to consider
ideas as akin to roadmaps: they serve as guides for, and constraints upon, interested
action. They determine which means and ends are imaginable, and therefore possi-
ble, and which are not. For illustration Goldstein quotes approvingly Alfred Weber:
“ideas act as ‘switchmen’ determining the ‘tracks along which action has been pushed
by the dynamic of interest”’ (Goldstein 1993, p. 12). Wells’s conversion is consistent
with the metaphor but also reveals its limitations.
When resort to protectionist principles for the purpose of securing e¤ective pro-
tection for cotton goods failed in early 1867, …rst Atkinson, and then Wells, adopted
and elaborated free trade ideas as another means to their original end. A schism
emerged between Wells and Atkinson, on one side, and other cotton manufacturers
on the other. As the two men established themselves more …rmly among the United
States’ chief advocates of free trade, they began to perceive di¤erently the interests
that they believed they served. Because they played a role, if a minor one, inthe elab-
oration of ideas, their “tracks” would seem not to have been …xed in place from the
67beginning to the end of their journey. Because their ideas altered their perceptions
of their interests, their “engine” would seem to have been modi…ed in transit.
A snapshot from later in the journey depicts their destination. In 1872, Arthur
Latham Perry, William Cullen Bryant, David Wells, and Edward Atkinson shared a
stage at Steinway Hall in New York City. They had come to denounce the result of
the Liberal Republican convention in Cincinnati, which had begun as a free trade
revolt against Grant and ended, to the free traders dismay, with the nomination of
protectionist Horace Greeley. Each of the four addressed the audience andproclaimed
the virtues and the logic of free trade. Wells, demonstrating the dramatic intellectual
turn he had taken in the past seven years, spoke of “the natural right to buy and sell,
to conduct one’s legitimate business without undue interference of the Government or
anybody” (NewYork Evening Post, May 31, 1872). Apartfrom Atkinson, though, few
cotton manufacturers could embrace the doctrine. Soon, Perry, Wells and Atkinson
would leave the Republican Party altogether, and each would spend the remainder
his life articulating the arguments that guided one side through the decades-long
controversy that followed.
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Table 1: Tariffs, actual and proposed, on standard cotton manufactures and on machinery, 1846-1867 
  
1846  1857  1861  1866  H.R. 718 (a)  Wells's bill H.R. 718 (b)  H.R. 718 (c) 
Cotton fabrics, unbleached    
     not exceeding 100 threads per sq. inch  25% [30%]
  19% [24%] 1 ¢/yd  
or 25% 
d
5 ¢/yd [6 ¢/yd] 
or 35% 
f









     not exceeding 200 threads per sq. inch  25% [30%] 19% [24%] 2 ¢/yd,  3 ¢/yd 
or 25% 
d,e
5 ¢/yd [6 ¢/yd] 
or 35% 
f









     over 200 threads per sq. inch  25% [30%] 19% [24%] 4 ¢/yd  
or 25% 
d
5 ¢/yd [7 ¢/yd] 
or 35% 
f










Iron & steel machinery & manufactures    
     machinery of iron, steel, or other metal  30%  24%  30%  35%  45%  35%  55%  55% 
     other manufactures of steel  30%  24%  30%  45%  50%  45%  50%  60% 
 
Notes:  
In 1846 and 1857, bracketed tariffs are those levied on unbleached cotton clothing and embroidered fabrics; unbracketed tariffs are those on other cotton fabrics, 
unembroidered and not fashioned into clothing.  In 1866 and in H.R. 718 (a), bracketed tariffs are those levied on unbleached cotton jeans, denims, drillings, 
bedtickings, ginghams, plaids, cottonades, pantaloon stuff, and goods of like description; unbracketed rates are those levied on all other unbleached cotton 
fabrics.  In 1861, in Wells’s bill, and in H.R. 718 (b) and (c), such distinctions are not made. 
 
H.R. 718(a) is “An Act to Provide Increased Revenue from Imports, and for Other Purposes,” passed by the House of Representatives on July 10, 1866 and 
referred to the Senate Finance Committee on July 12. 
 
H.R. 718(b) is the same bill, as amended and passed by the Senate on January 31, 1867. 
 
H.R. 718(c) is the same bill, as amended by the House Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed on February 18, 1867. 
 
d A duty of 25% ad valorem is substituted for the specific duty if the item’s value is above 16 cents per yard. 
   
e The specific duty is 2 cents if the thread count does not exceed 140 per sq. inch, and 3 cents if over 140 threads per sq. inch but not exceeding 200. 
 
f A duty of 35% ad valorem is substituted for the specific duty if the item’s value is above 16 cents per yard and the item is standard unbleached cotton fabric. 
The 35% ad valorem duty is substituted for the specific duty if the item’s value is above 20 cents per yard and the item is unbleached cotton denim or drillings. 
 
g If the specific duty amounts to less than 30% ad valorem, then 30% ad valorem will be levied. 
 
Sources:  
The tariffs of 1846, 1857, 1861, and 1866 can be found conveniently in Northrup and Turney (2003, v. III).  Wells’s bill was submitted as an attachment to his 
“Report of the Special Commissioner of the Revenue [for 1866]” (Wells 1867).  Wells also constructs, in Appendix C of his report, a useful table of comparative 
U.S. tariffs from 1842 to 1866.  The duties in the table presented here are taken from Wells’s Appendix C, corroborated by the original texts of the tariff bills 
from 1846 to 1866 in Northrup and Turney, and supplemented by the tariff rates in H.R. 718(b) and (c), which were not yet written at the time of Wells’s report, 
and which do not appear in Northrup and Turney because the bill was never passed.  H.R. 718 in all its permutations can be found in the Congressional Globe. 